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Schwartz: Contract Law - Indefinite Price Escalation Clause in Natural Gas

CONTRACT LAW- Indefinite Price
Contract; Unconscionable and
Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc.;
tion Co. and Phillips Petroleum

Escalation Clause in Natural Gas Sales
Contrary to Public Policy. Kerr McGee
Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Amoco ProducCo., 500 F. Supp. 624 (D. Wyo. 1980).

In 1957, Amoco Production Company ["Amoco"], Kerr
McGee Corp. ["Kerr McGee"], and Phillips Petroleum Co.
["Phillips"] each entered into independent long-term intrastate contracts with Northern Utilities Inc. ["Northern"], a
Wyoming public utility, for the sale of natural gas. In 1970,
Amoco and Northern executed a Supplemental Agreement to
this existing Gas Sales Contract which, among other things,
extended the duration of the contract twelve (12) years. 1 More
importantly, the Supplemental Agreement added a new indefinite price escalation clause to the contract which provided
as follows:
[6(b)] From and after January 1, 1976, when the
price to be paid by Northern to Pan American (Amoco)
pursuant to the other provision hereof is less than the
sum of the price received for gas being sold in interstate
commerce, by any producer within the State of Wyoming, except in the counties of Uinta and Lincoln, plus
three cents per one thousand cubic feet (3" Mcf), then
Northern shall increase the price to be paid Pan
American hereunder to a price equal to the price being
' '2
received by such producer plus three cents per Mcf.
This clause was inserted as an alternative to the base prices
provided in the contract; its purpose to insure that the contract
price would maintain market relevance over the entire term of
the contract. Hence, whenever the price paid to any purchaser
in interstate commerce exceeded the base price set out in the
contract, the contract price automatically escalated to that
new, higher price. In 1973, similar written amendments conby Northern and Kerr
taining clause 6(b) were executed
3
Phillips.
and
Northern
and
McGee
In 1975, the producers advised Northern that clause 6(b)
had been "triggered" because the prices being received by
other producers of gas in Wyoming for sales in interstate commerce were greatly exceeding the amount being paid to the
producers under the base price provisions of the Gas Sales
Copyright© 1982 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 628 (D. Wyo. 1980).
2. Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 627.
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Contracts. 4 Consequently, the contract price rose dramatically
through the operation of clause 6(b). By the time of the trial in
1980 the producers were claiming the interstate rate of $2.80
per million cubic feet (Mcf) through clause 6(b)-approximately
ten times more than the base price established for 1980 under
the contract.5
Northern brought suit against the producers in federal
court on the grounds that clause 6(b) was ambiguous and contrary to public policy.6 The district court for the district of
Wyoming concluded that owing to the "exorbitant" rates being passed along to consumers, clause 6(b) was void as against
public policy and unconscionable under Section 34-21-219 of
the Wyoming Statutes. The court struck the clause from the
contract, but enforced its remainder until expiration in 1990.
Finally, the court ordered the producers to return to Northern
the amount collected through the operation of clause 6(b) 7-a
total of $59,603,631.8
This note will begin by providing background information
necessary to place the public policy issue of natural gas regulation into context. Attention will be focused on the changing
rate-setting policies of the Federal Power Commission (FPC)9
from the enactmant of the Natural Gas Act in 1938 to the present. Next, the reasoning behind the district court's decision
will be briefly explained. Finally, the court's decision will be
analyzed and critiqued.
BACKGROUND: NATURAL GAS REGULATION

Before the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA), 10 the federal government had jurisdiction over
natural gas sales in interstate commerce under the Natural
Gas Act of 1938.11 In 1938, the states regulated the sale of
4. Id. at 631.
5. Id. at 633.
6. Brief for Appellant Amoco Production Comparly at 11, Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern
Utilities, Inc.; Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Amoco Production Co. and Phillips Petroleum
Co., Nos. 80-2273, 2274, 2275 (10th Cir., argued Sept. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Amoco Brief]. The issue of unconscionability was raised by Northern after the close of
evidence when it filed its memorandum brief. Id.
7. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 636.
8. Amoco Brief, supra note 6, at 1.
9. Pursuant to the National Gas Policy Act the Federal Power Commission became the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 15 U.S.C. S 3301(24)(Supp. III 1979).
10. Pub. L. No. 95-621, SS 1-602, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 3301-3432 (Supp. III
1979)) [hereinafter cited in text as NGPA].
11. Pub. L. No. 75-688, S 1-24, 52 Stat. 821 (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 717-717w (1976)).
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natural gas by application of a "fair value" test; prices were
fixed in order to allow a rate of return based on the reproduction costs of capital investment. In 1942, the FPC departed
from this rate scheme by adopting a policy which allowed only
"actual legitimate costs" to be used as the basis for a "just and
reasonable" rate of return. 2 This13policy became known as the
"prudent investment approach" and was approved by the
14
Supreme Court in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas.
With this methodology of determining rates of return by
reference to the costs of the individual producer, it appears
logical that the FPC would oppose the operation of indefinite
price escalation clauses. In fact, the FPC in its Order No. 2321s
banned the use of indefinite price escalation clauses' 6 in interstatesales contracts. In Order No. 232, the Commission objected to the adverse effect of these clauses which, in its
opinion, led to rates based not on the historic cost basis, but on
the collection of such a rate by another producer. 17 Hence, in
the eyes of the FPC, such clauses were "incompatible with the
public interest."'"
By 1960, however, the FPC had determined that setting
rates on a company-by-company cost approach was no longer
administratively feasible. 19 The Commission instead adopted
the policy of regulating prices on an area basis, whereby aggregate profits for the industry would be determined for
various producing areas around the country. The "area rate"
basis of regulation also set two prices for each producing area.
"Vintage pricing," as it came to be known, allowed higher
prices for "new" contracts (contracts entered into on or after
January 1, 1961) as an incentive for producers to engage in
further exploration and development; "old" contracts were
12. Comment, Natural Gas Rate Regulation: The Conflict in the Application of the Just and
Reasonable Standard, 12 TULSA L. J. 293, 304 (1976).

13. Id.
14. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

15. 25 F.P.C. 379 (1961).
16. Examples of indefinite escalation clauses include:

(a) Two-party favored nation clauses, which are activated by higher prices paid to any
other supplier by the same purchaser;
(b) Three-party favored nation clauses, which are activated by higher prices paid to any
other supplier by any purchaser.
For other examples see Pure Oil Co., 25 F.P.C. 383, 388 n.3 (1961).

17. See Pure Oil Co., supra note 16, at 389.
18. FPC Order No. 232, supra note 15, at 380.
19. Manning, Federal Regulation of Pricing Provisions in Natural Gas Sales Contracts-From the Phillips Decision to the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 Hous. L.

REV. 1081, 1088 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Manning].

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 11

260

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

held to lower rates because they were associated with lower
costs.2 0 Thus, vintage pricing was intended to serve the public
interest by balancing the interests of the consumer and the
investor.
This balance, however, became threatened as the United
States' energy scenario began to reflect shortages. Put simply,
the price of gas proved too low to meet market demand. 2 ' As
early as 1969, the FPC recognized the impending shortage,
noting a downward trend in the gas reserves to the gas production ratio. 22 In 1972 the FPC Staff wrote that the "emergence
of a natural gas shortage during the past two years marks a
historic turning point-the end of natural gas industry growth
'23
uninhibited by supply considerations.
In order to stimulate investment and increase supplies the
FPC abandoned area rate regulation in favor of establishing a
just and reasonable nationalrate for new gas.2 4 In Opinion No.
770,25 the FPC recognized that certain non-cost factor should
be considered in setting rates. The price of competitive fuels,
the impact upon supply and demand, inflationary pressures,
the nation's natural gas shortage, and conservation were all
recognized by the FPC as important factors to be considered
26
along with cost in the setting of just and reasonable rates.
Opinion No. 770 increased the uniform national rate by 270%,
but the FPC reasoned that consumers would benefit in the
"longer run" by those higher costs. Higher costs, according to
the FPC, would lead to increased gas supply and greater gas
conservation, and would make more gas available
for
27
residences, businesses, and industrial consumers.
In 1978 Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act which
expanded the jurisdiction of the FPC's successor agency, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), to include
both interstate and intrastatesales. 28 Under the Act, natural
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 1089.
Comment, supra note 12, at 309.
Id. at 309, n.87.
Comment, supra note 12, at 310 n.91 (quoting U.S. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION,
STAFF REPORT No. 2, NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1971-1990 (1972)).

24. Manning, supra note 19 at 1090. "New" gas was determined to be gas produced after
December 31, 1972. Id. at 1091.
25. [1976] 10 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew Bender) 5-293.
26. Manning, supra note 19, at 1092.
27. Id. at 1092-93.
28. 15 U.S.C. S 3301 (15), (16), (24) (Supp. III 1979).
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gas is priced by Congressionally authorized ceilings designed
to balance the goals of providing incentive for exploration and
protection for consumers. This balance is struck by departing
from cost-based gas pricing with respect to "new" incentive
gas and retaining a combination of
cost-based and non-cost fac29
tors in the pricing of "old" gas.
Significantly, and perhaps indicative of these underlying
changes in pricing policy, the Commission's Order No. 23 approved (or more accurately, declined to preclude) the operation
of certain indefinite price escalation provisions.30 In regard to
interstate sales contracts the Commission determined,
the Commission's regulations . . . do not preclude the
operation of price escalation provisions in a contract,
the terms of which specifically permit escalation to congressionally or legislatively authorized prices or which
specifically reference the Natural Gas Policy Act
prices.3 1
And, more significantly for the purposes of this discussion, the
Commission opined that with respect to existing intrastate
sales contracts,
As a general matter, fixed price and indefinite price
escalator clauses in existing intrastate contracts may
permit escalation of the price under the contract in accordance with the terms of that contract .... escalator
clauses may permit an increase in the contract price up
to but not in excess of the current new natural gas price
under section 102 of the Natural Gas Policy Act. Questions of contract interpretation are left, in the first instance, to the parties to the contract. In the event of
their disagreement,
the question should be left to state
32
courts to resolve.
The NGPA mandated that substantial decontrol of natural
gas prices is in the best interest of the United States; under the
Act, a significant portion of the nation's gas will be
deregulated by 1987. s3 Notably, President Reagan's advisors
29. Manning, supra note 19, at 1094.

30. Id. at 1083-84.
31. Id. at 1084 (quoting [1979] 17 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew Bender) 5-261).

32. Id. (quoting [1979] 17 FED. POWER SERV. (Matthew Bender) 5-262).
33. See 15 U.S.C. S 3331 (Supp. III 1979).
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are currently recommending that he press for faster and more
complete decontrol of both newly discovered gas and "old"
gas.8 4 Hence, it appears that United States natural gas policy
may soon reflect deregulatory attitudes even more dramatically than does the NGPA. Certainly, those changes will have a
very large impact on the consumer's natural gas bill. It is the
premise of deregulation, however, that this negative impact is
necessary to stimulate the positive goals of increasing supplies, encouraging conservation, and building national energy
independence.35
THE COURT'S DECISION

The district court pointed out very early in its "Conclusions of Law" that this case involves a substantial public interest since Northern receives approximately 85% of its gas
under the contracts involved in this case.3 6 The price of this
gas, the court noted, increased under the contracts through
clause 6(b) from a price of .28 cents per Mcf in 1975 to $2.80
per Mcf in 1980; this translated, in the court's judgment, to an
increase in the consumers' monthly gas bill from $30 per
month to approximately $250 per month. 37 These dramatic increases could have a "devastating" impact on the communities
served by Northern. 38 Further, held the court, "paragraph 6(b)
causes windfall profits and substantially increases the costs to
consumers for a commodity without which they may well not
be able to live." 39
These general views regarding the extremely adverse effects of the clause upon the public interest certainly influenced
the court's reasoning in reaching its specific legal conclusion
that the clause was both "void as against public policy" and
"unconscionable" under Section 34-21-219 of the Wyoming
Statutes. Unfortunately, for purposes of analysis, the court
beyond this generally bakes the public policy issue and the unconscionability issue in the same pie, making it difficult to
Hershey, The New Battle Over Natural Gas, N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1981, S 3, at 1, col. 1.
See MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 811 (1979).
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 633.
Id. The court's conclusion about the increase in the consumer's gas bill has been severely
criticized by the producers on appeal. They argue that these figures are derived from a
hypothetical situation rather than the actual situation. The producers contend that,
rather than $250, the average monthly gas bill would be $46.80. See Amoco Brief, supra
note 6, at 33.
38. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 636.
39. Id.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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determine which specific ingredients make the clause unconscionable and which specific ingredients make it contrary to
public policy.
Certain circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the
Supplemental Agreement, however, appear to constitute the
underpinnings of the court's unconscionability conclusion. The
court states that clause 6(b) was designed by Amoco's legal
counsel and was a "unique provision" not in common use in the
industry. 40 Moreover, the producers "were aware of the then
current proposals to change ceiling prices and methods
concerning them as stated in the notices of the F.P.C."' 4 1 Northern, on the other hand, "did not contemplate nor was it suggested by any other party that FPC pricing practices then existing and contemplated would materially or substantially
change during the term of said contracts." 42 Finally, clause
6(b), "as intended by the producers, would remove all price
restraints from the contract and fix a then indefinite price that
would result in windfalls to the producers... and harsh results
to the consumer. ' 43 These factors, it appears, constitute the
court's major supports for finding the clause unconscionable at
the time of its making.
The above considerations also flowed over into the court's
conclusion that the clause was contrary to public policy. Certain other factors, however, appear more important to the
court in its public policy determination. First, the court
generally attacks indefinite price escalator clauses by citing
unfavorable language concerning them in FPC and judicial opinions. The Supreme Court, for example, held in a 1968 decision
that indefinite escalator clauses by their design and function
alone may be incompatible with the public interest because of
their artificial relation to the economics of a particular operation. 44 Similarly, a Tenth Circuit concurring opinion was cited
which stated that: "These clauses naturally grant an advantage to the seller. As such they have generally been construed
in favor of the buyer against the seller. Neither the courts, nor
regulatory agencies have looked upon them with favor. ' ' 45
40. Id. at 628-29.
41. Id. at 635.
42. Id. at 632.
43. Id. at 635.

44. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 783 (1968).
45. Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281, 1295 (10th Cir. 1979) (concurring opinion).
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Significantly, on this point the district court distinguished a
1980 Wyoming Supreme Court decision, Amoco Production
Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. of Wyoming, 46 which upheld the
validity of such a clause; the district court distinguished Staufthat the public policy issue was
fer factually and on the grounds
47
not directly before the court.
The district court's second major justification for invalidating the clause on public policy grounds rests on its finding that the effect of clause 6(b) was contrary to the pricing
policies of the FPC. Those policies, held the court, set prices
for interstate commerce by determining the "producers' costs
plus a reasonable return on investment"-not the method by
which prices were set by clause 6(b).48 In addition, the court
pointed out that the rates demanded by the producers were intended by the FPC to apply only to such contracts that exhibited certain "conditions precedent", namely, that the gas
be "new" and the producers be "small". Since neither condition was fulfilled under this contract, the court held that the
producers' demands were void as against public policy and
unconscionable

.49

Hence, the court struck clause 6(b) from the contract and
ordered the producers to return the rates collected through its
operation 5 -a sum of $59,603,631.51 The court chose to enforce the remainder of the contract, setting the contract price
at the previously negotiated base price determined for each
year under the contract. 52 These prices will apply until the contract's expiration in 1990.
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

Unconscionability
The State of Wyoming has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code provision on unconscionable contracts. It reads in
part as follows:
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980).
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 636.
Id. at 632.
Id. at 635.
Id. at 636.
Amoco Brief, supra note 6, at 1.
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 636.
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34-21-219 Unconscionable contract or clause.
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result 6 3
The parameters of this provision have been elucidated by the
6 4 In
Wyoming Supreme Court in Estate of Frederick.
Frederick, the court held that unconscionability "is tested as
of the time the agreement is made and not in accordance with
hindsight"6 5 (emphasis added). In addition, the Frederickdecision spelled out other considerations to be looked at in determining unconscionability. These considerations were recently
reiterated in a 1980 Wyoming Supreme Court decision:
Other courts have indicated that in the context of
the formation of the contract, it is important to determine whether the [persons claiming that the contract
was unconscionable] were deprived of meaningful
choice as to whether to enter into the contract; whether
[the persons claiming that the contract is unconscionable] were compelled to accept the terms; whether
there was opportunity for meaningful negotiation; and,
whether there was such gross inequality of bargaining
power that negotiations were not possible for the aggrieved party, or whether the aggrieved party was
underprivileged, uneducated or illiterate and the type of
person easily deceived or taken advantage of, or
whether the aggrieved party could comprehend and was
manner surprisaware of the agreement or was in some
56
ed by fine print or concealed terms.
The district court appears to have discounted the importance of Frederick;there is no mention of the case and it is difficult to understand how the facts of the present case could be
squared with Frederick's parameters. Several important
observations result from an analysis of the negotiation of the
Supplemental Agreement: 1) There is little indication of a
53. Wyo. STAT. S 34-21-219 (1977); U.C.C. S 2-302.

54. 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979).
55. Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
56. Cline v. Safeco Insurance Co., 614 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Wyo. 1980) (citations omitted).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1982

9

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 17 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 11

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVII

deprivation of meaningful choice; Northern exercised its right
under the original Gas Sales Contract to negotiate for the purchase of additional gas. 57 2) Northern was not compelled to accept the terms; it bargained successfully for a twelve-year extension of the original contract. 58 3) Northern was not deprived of an opportunity for meaningful negotiations; the negotiations lasted for over five months. 59 4) There is no indication of
a gross inequality of bargaining position; Northern is a large
public utility which was represented by an experienced attorney at the negotiations.6 0 5) Clause 6(b) was not in fine print
or concealed; rather, the clause was the major concession
granted by Northern in exchange for the extension of the
contract.61
The Frederick parameters refer to aspects of
"procedural" unconscionability, or, as one commentator has
put it, "bargaining naughtiness." '6 2 Put simply, "procedural"
unconscionability corresponds to the conduct surrounding the
negotiation of a contract; "substantive" unconscionability, on
the other hand, refers to the unjust result of a contractual
agreement. Procedural and substantive unconscionability
naturally go hand in hand, unfair results predictably following
unfair negotiation. In fact, it is only on the very rarest of occaa clause without
sions that courts have voided a contract 6or
3
present.
unconscionability
of
both aspects
As suggested above, this case does not appear to present
typical or striking aspects of procedural unconscionability of
the kind outlined in Frederick. The district court, however,
does suggest three factors which perhaps suggest the presence
of an element of advantage taken during the negotiation of the
Supplemental Agreement: 1) The uniqueness of clause 6(b)
that was drafted by sophisticated Amoco attorneys, 2) The producer's knowledge and Northern's ignorance of forthcoming
changes in FPC rate setting procedures, and 3) The intention
Amoco Brief, supra note 6, at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 35.
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 487 (1967), quoted in WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 151 (2d ed.
1980).
63. See WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 62, at 163-66.
Research indicates that courts have never voided a clause or contract between merchants
on unconscionability grounds in the absence of aspects of "procedural" unconscionability.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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of the producers to remove price restraints leading to windfalls
for themselves and harsh results for consumers. Taken
together, these three factors suggest a scenario of Northern
agreeing under subtle pressure to a clause it did not want nor
fully understand. This conclusion, however, is vulnerable to
several criticisms.
First, clause 6(b) is not unique in the industry. It is a
representative example of a third-party favored nation's
clause used extensively in the industry. E. Neuner, an expert
in the natural gas contract area defines a third-party favored
nation's clause as one in which "the buyer is obligated to pay to
the seller the equivalent of any higher price which a third-party
purchaser may subsequently pay for a comparable quantity of
gas within a defined geographical area."' 64 Notably, this definition appeared in Neuner's book ten years before the negotiation of this clause. Similarly, a 1955 Congressional hearing
pointed out that favored-nation's clauses were "prevalent in
the industry as early as 1947."r35
Perhaps the district court's primary concern here is not
the uniqueness of clause 6(b) in the industry, but its newness in
Northern's eyes. Hence, the novelty of the clause to Northern,
coupled with the shrewd and sophisticated negotiation of the
Amoco attorneys may certainly suggest a situation where Northern was "outgunned" at the bargaining table. The question
remains, however, whether this constituted an unfair "overreaching" of Northern.
Certainly, Amoco's tremendous resources and business
savvy would be relevant considerations in determining
whether it had unfairly taken advantage of a consumer during
negotiations. In consumer contracts, courts have often held
that these considerations point to an inequality of bargaining
the conpower that may, in some circumstances, facilitate
66
sumer's release from his contract obligation.
64. NEUNER, THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 265-66 (1960), quoted in Amicus Curiae Brief of
Legal Foundation of America at 8, Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc.; Northern Utilities, Inc. v. Amoco Production Co. and Phillips Petroleum Co., Nos. 80-2273,
2274, 2275 (10th Cir., argued Sept. 30, 1981).
65. Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearingson S. 712 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1593 (1955), quoted in Amicus
Curiae Brief of Legal Foundation of America, supra note 64, at 8.
66. See WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 62, at 153.
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Unlike the consumer, however, Northern as a large public
utility would seemingly possess the necessary resources to
bargain with strength against Amoco. There is no evidence of
a gross inequality in bargaining power between Northern and
Amoco. The district court, however, appears to look beyond
the two-party contractual relationship to include the consumer's interest in the bargaining equation. In this way, Northern becomes the "representative of the consumer," the contract for the sale of gas becomes a "consumer sale," and
Amoco's behavior is judged as if it were bargaining across the
table from the consumer.
This view of the contract appears to have some inherent
merit when considering that it is the consumer who will
ultimately bear most of the burden and receive most of the
benefit from the bargain between Northern and Amoco. Obviously, such an approach invests a public utility with extraordinary protection against "overreaching". In fact, it appears
that this view of the contract would introduce issues of unequal
bargaining power and procedural unconscionability in every
contract between a utility and a large business entity. This inherent procedural unconscionability could conceivably be cited
anytime a utility desired to escape from a contract with
allegedly unconscionable results.
Very much related to this issue is the district court's suggestion that the producers acted improperly when they
bargained for clause 6(b) while knowing of impending FPC
price setting changes. This, according to the court's analysis,
amounted to an unfair advantage because Northern was ignorant of any possible pricing changes. 67 The import of this
reasoning is clear: The producers owed Northern some "duty
to disclose" any information they may have had about possible
FPC changes and the effect of those changes on clause 6(b).
The general rule on this point is that "it is not necessarily
fraudulent for one party to a bargain consciously to take
advantage of the ignorance or mistake of the other party, provided.., there is no duty of disclosure arising from a special or
fiduciary relation of the parties based on trust or
confidence." 68 On the surface, a special or fiduciary relation67. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 630, 632.
68. WILLISTON, 12 CoNTRACTS S 1497 (3d ed. 1970) (emphasis added).
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ship of the kind traditionally recognized by courts does not
appear to exist between the parties to this contract.69 The
district court's opinion, however, suggests that just such a
relationship grows out of Northern's special obligation to act
in the public interest. The court's sharp criticism of the producer's "disregard" of the interest of Northern and the public
in seeking "to remove price restraints" leading to "harsh
results" for consumers70 seems to indicate that the producers
had some duty, along with Northern, to act in the public interest. If one accepts the existence of a special relationship
between the parties, then the actions of the producers (such as
the use of a "new" clause, failure to disclose information, intent to extract the highest possible price, and generally shrewd
and resourceful bargaining behavior) can all be viewed as an
avoidance of their special obligation to Northern and the
public. Such an avoidance appears to provide the district court
with a basis for its finding of "procedural" unconscionability.
One searches in vain, however, for judicial precedent
creating a special or fiduciary relationship between a public
utlilty and the private entities with which it contracts; nor has
research produced cases where the consumer was deemed
effectively "present" in the form of a utility in the negotiation
of contracts between a utility and a private entity. If either or
both of these conclusions are the implicit holdings of the
district court, the amount of judicial protection extended to
consumers against "unfair" prices for their use of utilities is
indeed extensive.
Judicial protection in this form, however, may create
serious policy problems. First, parties will probably be
discouraged from contracting with public utilities because of
uncertainty regarding those parties' obligations during
negotiations. Second, those parties who do contract with
public utilities may desire increased "compensation" for the
increased risk involved. Such compensation could take the
form of higher prices or lower supply dedications. Finally, the
court's decision tends to place the public utility in a favored
position by insulating it from making mistakes. This could
very well create disincentives to efficient and effective
management.
69. See id. S 1497 n.3.
70. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 632, 634, 635.
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It is suggested that the court could have avoided this venture into uncharted waters by concentrating less on the producer's "badness" and the public interest and more on the element of surprise inherent in the case. Put simply, Northern
was surprised that prices went as high as they did. It appears
that the producers, too, were surprised. 1 Under these circumstarices, perhaps the doctrine of impracticability might
constitute a more appropriate tool than unconscionability for
purposes of voiding clause 6(b). Impracticability excuses the
performance by a party to a contract if that performance has
been made impracticable by "the occurrence of a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made... ,
Certainly, both parties to this contract assumed prices
might, and probably would, increase. But it is almost as certain
that both parties assumed that prices would not increase as
quickly and as drastically as they did owing to the unexpected
severity of the 1970's energy shocks. The impracticability
defense has been recently urged by sellers of energy resources
seeking to avoid the very low prices they had committed to in
their long-term contracts. The underpinning of these sellers'
argument is that they relied upon the assumption that the
energy market would remain somewhat stable in the
seventies. 73 Northern's plight as a buyer, although inverse, is
analogous to the plight of these sellers. Perhaps the application of impracticability doctrine in this case would address the
facts of this controversy with less'doctrinal manipulation and
fewer adverse policy ramifications than is involved with the application of the unconscionability doctrine.
Public Policy
The district court also held that clause 6(b) was invalid as
against public policy. Certainly, part of the court's decision in
this regard is tied to its stance on the unconscionability of
71. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 632.
72. Wyo. STAT. S 34-21-278 (1977); U.C.C. S 2-615.

73. Courts in these cases have looked both to the foreseeability of the occurrence of the contingency and the severity of the price increases involved. The greater the foreseeability
of the contingency and the smaller the price increase involved, the smaller are the
chances of excuse on impracticability grounds. See Wallach, Excuse Defense in the Law oj
Contracts,55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 203 (1980). Although the express language of U.C.C. S
2-615 refers to sellers, Comment 9 states that the "reason of the present section may we!l
apply and entitle the buyer to the exemption." U.C.C. S 2-615, Comment 9 (emphasis
added).
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clause 6(b); it would appear that by definition an unconscionable clause is also contrary to public policy. The court,
however, appeared to rely on two additional factors in its
public policy determination that were largely unrelated to unconscionability. First, the court noted the suspect nature of indefinite price escalation clauses in general as evinced by the
opinions of various courts and the FPC. Second, the court
criticized the effect of clause 6(b) as being contrary to the pricing policies of the FPC.
Indefinite Price EscalationClauses in General
The United States Supreme Court in In re PermianBasin
Area Rate Cases upheld the FPC's new "area rate" policy for
setting prices for interstate gas sales.7 4 It also reiterated its
approval of the FPC's 1961 prohibition of indefinite price
escalation clauses in interstate gas sales contracts where such
clauses escalated prices above the area maximum rates. (See
Background). Quoting the FPC, the Supreme Court wrote:
"Indefinite escalation clauses 'cause price increases to . . .
occur without reference to the circumstances or economics of
the particular operation, but solely because of what happens
under another contract'." 7 5 Similarly, a concurring opinion in
the Tenth Circuit case of SuperiorOil Co. v. Western Slope Gas
Co.7 6 quotes extensively from FPC Order No. 341 which attacks the economic artificiality of such indefinite price
77
escalators.
The district court relied heavily upon the above opinions in
its general attack on indefinite price escalators. 78 These
opinions do establish significant authority for the proposition
that indefinite price escalator clauses may be contrary to
public policy-even in intrastate contracts. More recent
authority, however, challenges this view.
After the adoption of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
the FERC promulgated Order No. 2379 which permitted the
operation of certain price escalation provisions in both
74. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, supra note 44.

75. Id. at 782-83.
76. 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 1295 (concurring opinion
78. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v.Northern Utilities, Inc., supranote 1, at 635-36.
79. [1979] 17 FED. POWER SERV.(Matthew Bender) 5-253.
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interstate and intrastate contracts. In regard to intrastate
contracts the Commission wrote:
As a general matter, fixed price and indefinite price
escalator clauses in existing intrastate contracts may
permit escalation of the price under the contract in accordance with the terms of that contract. In a case
where section 105(bXl) of the Natural Gas Policy Act
applies, escalator clauses may permit an increase in the
contract price up to but not in excess of the current new
natural gas price under section 102 of the Natural Gas
Policy Act. Questions of contract interpretation are left,
in the first instance, to the parties to the contract. In
the event of their disagreement, the question should be
left to the state courts to resolve ....80
Perhaps because of its recent . origin this language was not
available to the court in its examination of the controversy in
this case. Nonetheless, Order No. 23 is a more current piece of
evidence which demonstrates an acceptance of escalation
clauses by the FERC in contrast to the more antagonistic
views of the FPC in the sixties. It is suggested that Order No.
23 indicates that an analysis by the district court of more
recent expressions of federal energy policy in the current era
of shortages may have cast a significantly more favorable light
on indefinite price escalation clauses.
With the FPC-FERC's consideration of non-cost factors in
the pricing of gas, and the current moves toward deregulation,
(See Background), it appears that the reasons behind opposition to such clauses are becoming less compelling. With the nation's new emphasis in increasing supplies and encouraging
conservation, no longer do prices set by reference to what
other producers are receiving (the market price) appear so "artificial"; nor, with these goals in mind, does it seem clear that
higher prices set by escalation clauses are against the public interest. As one commentator has stated: "A low price is an admirable objective only if there is gas available; the consumer is
not benefited by a low price if there is no gas to be supplied."'"
At any rate, even if the FPC's opinions before the enactment of the NGPA constituted a clear mandate that indefinite
80. Id. at 5-261 to 262, quoted in Manning, supra note 19, at 1084.
81. Comment, supra note 12, at 317.
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price escalator's were contrary to public policy in interstate
sales, it must be recalled that the FPC's authority at that time
did not extend to intrastate sales of gas. Hence, the FPC
opinions are valid only for purposes of extrapolation in determining what is public policy for intrastatesales.8 2 Indeed, this
is the states' arena in which to set policy, which the Committee
on Conference for the NGPA made clear in 1978:
The conference agreement also cedes the Federal
Government's authority to further limit the operation of
indefinite price escalator clauses to state governments
wishing to do so. The Congress, by adoption of this section, recognizes the right of states to prescribe more
of such clauses
stringent limitations on the 8operation
3
than those prescribed herein.
The State of Wyoming has enacted no legislation limiting the
operation of such clauses. The Wyoming Supreme Court in
Stauffer approved the operation of a clause all but identical to
the one at issue in this case.84 The court wrote in Stauffer:
Favored nation clauses are a common feature of gas
purchase and sale contracts. The nature of the product
and its questionable availability engenders reluctance
on the part of producers to enter into long-term contracts at the price prevailing at the time of the contract.
Yet purchasers require long-term commitments to ensure an adequate supply of gas. . . . A third-party
favored nations clause requires the purchaser to match
any higher price contracted to be paid by any other
buyer in the same field or area. Favorednations clauses
are recognized by the courts.8 5
The district court distinguished Stauffer on the grounds that
the "public policy issue was not before the court." 8 6 To the
82. See 16 AM. JUR. 2d Conflicts of Law S 19 (1979).
83. H.C. REP. No. 95, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7, reprintedin 119781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9000.
84. That clause read: "If at any time ... the Federal Power Commission . . . shall

prescribe or approve a ceiling price or prices, however determined, which is generally applicable to gas being sold from the area in which the gas subject hereto is sold, which ... is
higher than the then applicable price lunder the contractl, the price for gas sold
hereunder shall be increased to equal such higher price .. " Amoco Production Co. v.
Stauffer Chemical Co. of Wyoming, supra note 46, at 464.
85. Id. at 468 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
86. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 636. The district court also

stated that Stauffer differed factually from this case, but did not elaborate upon this
point. Id. Perhaps the Court had in mind that in Stauffer there was no public utility in-

volved. If this is the distinguishing feature of Stauffer in the court's analysis, such a
determination would correspond to the previously discussed implicit holdings of the court
on unconscionability which tend to place the public utility in a favored position in negotiations with private parties.
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contrary, however, the public policy issue was discussed by
both parties to the suit in their answer briefs.87 Stauffer appears to be the clearest statement of Wyoming's public policy
on this issue. Pursuant to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,8 its
precedent demands considerable deference. In sum, the
district court's general attack on indefinite price escalator
clauses rest on relatively limited and dated expressions of
public policy. Especially in the light of Stauffer, the court's
analysis of this issue does not provide clear and convincing
support for a conclusion that clause 6(b) was contrary to public
policy.
FPCPricing Policy and the Effect of Clause 6(b)
Beginning in 1960, the FPC introduced "vintaging" concepts into its pricing policies. "Vintaging" referred to the age
of the gas under contract; higher prices were allowed for
"new" gas than for "old" gas because of the higher costs
associated with producing new gas. Additionally, when the
FPC adopted its national rate policy in 1972, small producers
were allowed higher prices than large producers to encourage
"wildcat " exploration. Thus, the "new" vintage of gas and the
small size of the producer constituted two conditions precedent
to the collection of the highest rates set by the FPC. (See
Background).
The district court pointed out the fact that the gas involved
under this contract was not "new" gas, nor were the producers "small" under FPC definitions.8 9 Nevertheless, the
producers were demanding rates applicable to new gas produced by small producers through clause 6(b) which set the contract price at the highest price being received by any Wyoming
producer in interstate commerce. The court concluded that
allowing the producers to collect these high prices for natural
gas without fulfilling the conditions precedent required for collection in interstate sales by the FPC would violate public
policy. 90
Although the producer's demands may be criticized on this
point for lacking public spiritedness, the court cited scant
87. See Amoco Brief, supra note 6, at Appendix.
88. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

89. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., supra note 1, at 635.
90. Id.
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authority for declaring these demands illegal.91 Again, FPC
pricing policies are relevant in determining what public policy
may be in intrastate sales, but the states are the ultimate
policy makers in this arena. Again, the Wyoming Supreme
Court appears to have set this policy in Stauffer. In Stauffer,
the court held that:
the parties would have inserted such words in the contract if they intended the sale of gas to be subject to vintaging ...

vintaging is a form of control utilized by the

FPC, and application of it to the contract price can be
said to be contrary to the overall intention of the parties
as expressed in the contract .... 92
The court concluded: "it is a fundamental principle that a court
may not make a new contract for the parties or rewrite their
contract under the guise of construction. . . ."93 Stauffer

arguably stands for the proposition that the operation of indefinite price escalator clauses without reference to FPC "vintaging" requirements is not contrary to Wyoming public
policy.
Significantly, a recent Fifth Circuit decision indicates that
this operation may not be contrary to United States public
policy expressed under the NGPA.9 4 Observing that the NGPA
placed limits on the operation of indefinite price escalator
clauses in only four situations-none of which apply in this
case 9 5-the court held that escalator clauses are enforceable
and may otherwise operate according to their terms without
96
reference to vintaging.
The above discussion suggests that the district court's invalidation of clause 6(b) on public policy grounds rests on a
determination of public policy by the court which is open to
disagreement. In the absence of statutes and binding judicial
rulings in a particular area, determining public policy can be a
91. Such authority might be found by reference again to a "special or fiduciary"relationship
between Northern and the producers; perhaps this idea also influenced the court at this

point in its opinion.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. of Wyoming, supra note 46, at 467.
Id.
Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981).
Under the NGPA, certain "high cost" gas prices (e.g., deep well and "stripper well" gas

prices) will not trigger escalation provisions in other contracts. See 15 U.S.C. S3315(3XD)
(Supp. I1 1979).
96. Pennzoil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, supra note 94, at 378.
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very difficult and subjective process. Because of the lack of
clarity of public policy in these instances, courts should
hesitate from using public policy as a tool of invalidation of
contractual agreements. 97 As one court has stated, public
policy invalidation "is a very unruly horse, and when you once
get astride it you never know where it will carry you. '"98
CONCLUSION

The district court's decision in Kerr-McGee Corp. v.
Northern Utilities,Inc. ultimately protects the consumer's interest in paying a "fair" price for natural gas. What a "fair"
price for natural gas is has been the subject of much disagreement, especially in the last decade. The court, however, has
determined that dramatic increases tied to indefinite price
escalation clauses can be unfair to the consumer. Certainly,
many would agree with this point of view. As has been discussed, however, "fairness" must be determined within the context of the current energy environment. In many ways, the
NGPA was an attempt to establish fair prices in the light of the
changes of the seventies; under the NGPA fair prices were
determined not only by considering the impact upon the consumer, but also by considering the impact on supply and
conservation.
The district court's decision in this case indicates that the
judicial branch of government will continue to play a part in
determining the contours of the natural gas policy of the
United States. Those engaged in contract negotiations in the
natural gas area should be wary of looking exclusively to the
NGPA for guidance. Judicial construction of agreements in
this area will continue to warrant special consideration in
contracting.99
WILLIAM P. SCHWARTZ

97. See WILLISTON, 14 CONTRACTS, supra note 68, at S 1630.
98. Id. S 1629 (quoting Tracey v. Franklin, 30 Del. Ch. 407, 61 A.2d 780 (1948), affd, 31 Del.
Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (1949)).
99. This case was argued on appeal before the 10th Circuit on September 30, 1981.
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